Department of Psychology consider a moral violation to be personal if it meets Princeton University three criteria: First, the violation must be likely to cause 2 Center for the Study of Brain, serious bodily harm. Second, this harm must befall a Mind, and Behavior particular person or set of persons. Third, the harm must Princeton University not result from the deflection of an existing threat onto Princeton, New Jersey 08544 a different party. One can think of these three criteria in terms of "ME HURT YOU." The "HURT" criterion picks out the most primitive kinds of harmful violations (e.g., Summary assault rather than insider trading) while the "YOU" criterion ensures that the victim be vividly represented as Traditional theories of moral psychology emphasize an individual. Finally, the "ME" condition captures a noreasoning and "higher cognition," while more recent tion of "agency," requiring that the action spring in a work emphasizes the role of emotion. The present direct way from the agent's will, that it be "authored" fMRI data support a theory of moral judgment acrather than merely "edited" by the agent. Dilemmas that cording to which both "cognitive" and emotional profail to meet these three criteria are classified as "impercesses play crucial and sometimes mutually competisonal." As noted previously (Greene et al., 2001), these tive roles. The present results indicate that brain three criteria reflect a provisional attempt to capture regions associated with abstract reasoning and cogniwhat we suppose is a natural distinction in moral psytive control (including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex chology and will likely be revised in light of future reand anterior cingulate cortex) are recruited to resolve search.
to possess a domain-general capacity for sophisticated time to respond (high-RT trials), as compared to trials in which the participant responds quickly (low-RT), reabstract reasoning, and it would be surprising as well if this capacity played no role in human moral judgment. flecting presumed conflict in processing. Likewise, we predicted that regions in the dorsolateral prefrontal corThus, we sought evidence in support of the hypothesis that moral judgment in response to violations familiar tex (DLPFC) would also exhibit increased activity for high-RT trials (as compared to low-RT trials), reflecting to our primate ancestors (personal violations) are driven by social-emotional responses while moral judgment the engagement of abstract reasoning processes and cognitive control (Miller and Cohen, 2001 ). in response to distinctively human (impersonal) moral violation is (or can be) more "cognitive."
Second, we tested the hypothesis that, in the dilemmas under consideration, these control processes work Our previous results supported this hypothesis in two ways (Greene and Haidt, 2002; Greene et al., 2001). First, against the social-emotional responses described above and in favor of utilitarian judgments, i.e., judgments that we found that brain areas associated with emotion and social cognition (medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cinmaximize aggregate welfare (e.g., by sacrificing one life in order to save five others). In keeping with this hypothegulate/precuneus, and superior temporal sulcus/temperoparietal junction) exhibited increased activity while sis, we predicted increased DLPFC activity for trials in which participants judged personal moral violations to participants considered personal moral dilemmas, while "cognitive" brain areas associated with abstract reasonbe appropriate, as compared to trials in which participants judged personal moral violations to be inappropriing and problem solving exhibited increased activity while participants considered impersonal moral diate. In other words, this hypothesis predicted that the level of activity in regions of DLPFC would correlate lemmas.
Second, we found that reaction times (RTs) were, on positively with utilitarian moral judgment. We emphasize that this prediction goes beyond those explored in our average, considerably longer for trials in which participants judged personal moral violations to be approprevious work. Previously, we found that different classes of moral dilemma (personal versus impersonal) priate, as compared to trials in which participants judged personal moral violations to be inappropriate. No comproduce different patterns of neural activity in the brains of moral decision makers. Here we test the hypothesis parable effect was observed for impersonal moral judgment. We compare this effect on RT to the Stroop effect that different patterns of neural activity in response to the same class of moral dilemma are correlated with (MacLeod, 1991; Stroop, 1935) , in which people are slow to name the color of the ink in which an incongruent differences in moral decision-making behavior.
To test the predictions of this theory, we focused on word appears (e.g., "red" written in green ink). According to our theory, personal moral violations elicit prepotent, a class of dilemmas that bring "cognitive" and emotional factors into more balanced tension than those featured negative social-emotional responses that drive people to deem such actions inappropriate. Therefore, in order in our previous work. For example, consider the following moral dilemma (the crying baby dilemma). to judge a personal moral violation to be appropriate one must overcome a prepotent response, just as one Enemy soldiers have taken over your village. They have orders to kill all remaining civilians. You and some faced with the color-naming Stroop task must overcome the temptation to read the word "red" when it is written of your townspeople have sought refuge in the cellar of a large house. Outside, you hear the voices of soldiers in green ink. The sort of mental discipline required by the Stroop task is known as "cognitive control," the who have come to search the house for valuables. Your baby begins to cry loudly. You cover his mouth ability to guide attention, thought, and action in accordance with goals or intentions, particularly in the face to block the sound. If you remove your hand from his mouth, his crying will summon the attention of the solof competing behavioral pressures (Cohen et al., 1990; Posner and Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin and Schneider, 1977) . diers who will kill you, your child, and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save yourself and the others, you We interpreted the behavioral results of our previous study as evidence that when participants responded in must smother your child to death. Is it appropriate for you to smother your child in order a utilitarian manner (judging personal moral violations to be acceptable when they serve a greater good) such to save yourself and the other townspeople? This is a difficult personal moral dilemma. In response responses not only reflected the involvement of abstract reasoning but also the engagement of cognitive control to this dilemma, participants tend to answer slowly, and they exhibit no consensus in their judgments. This diin order to overcome prepotent social-emotional responses elicited by these dilemmas. lemma, like the other consistently difficult dilemmas used here, has a specific structure: in order to maximize Our present aim was to further test our theory of moral judgment by directly testing two specific hypotheses aggregate welfare (in this case, save the most lives), one must commit a personal moral violation (in this case, derived from the arguments above. First, we tested the hypothesis that increased RT in response to personal smother the baby). According to our theory, this dilemma is difficult because the negative social-emotional moral dilemmas results from the conflict associated with competition between a strong prepotent response and response associated with the thought of killing one's own child competes with a more abstract, "cognitive" a response supported by abstract reasoning and the application of cognitive control. In keeping with this hyunderstanding that, in terms of lives saved/lost, one has nothing to lose (relative to the alternative) and much to pothesis, we predicted that the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a brain region associated with cognitive conflict gain by carrying out this horrific act. We believe that the ACC responds to this conflict and that control-related in the Stroop and other tasks (Botvinick et al., 2001 ), would exhibit increased activity during personal moral processes in the DLPFC tend to favor the aforementioned "cognitive" response. We hypothesize that these judgment for trials in which the participant takes a long The present results are from three increasingly focused analyses of a single data set drawn from 41 participants who responded to moral dilemmas while having their brains scanned using fMRI. control processes, insofar as they are effective, drive processes favoring a utilitarian response. Analysis 2 was performed only on high-RT trials because of the relative the individual to the utilitarian conclusion that it is appropriate to smother the baby in order to save more lives.
paucity of low-RT-utilitarian judgments and the need to control for RT. This case contrasts with "easy" personal moral dilemmas, ones that receive relatively rapid and uniform judgments (at least from the subjects within our sample).
Results One such case is the infanticide dilemma in which a teenage mother must decide whether or not to kill her
Replication of Previous Results
Previously, we distinguished between personal and imunwanted newborn infant. According to our theory, this dilemma is relatively easy because the negative socialpersonal moral judgments and found that brain areas associated with emotion and social cognition (medial emotional response associated with the thought of someone killing her own child dominates the weak or prefrontal cortex, BA 9/10; posterior cingulate/precuneus, BA 31/7; and bilateral superior temporal sulcus nonexistent "cognitive" case in favor of this action. Here there is no significant cognitive conflict and no need for (STS)/inferior parietal lobe, BA 39) exhibited relatively greater activity for personal moral judgment, while brain extended reasoning or cognitive control. Thus, compared to the high-RT trials typically generated by cases areas associated with working memory and other characteristically "cognitive" processes (right DLPFC, BA 46; like crying baby, the low-RT trials typically generated by cases such as infanticide should exhibit lower levels bilateral inferior parietal lobe, BA 40) exhibited relatively greater activity for impersonal moral judgment (Greene of activity in the ACC and DLPFC.
The analyses required to test these assertions make et al., 2001). The present data, drawn from 41 participants, replicated each of these results (Table 1) , as well up a nested structure (Figure 1) . Previously, we compared the neural activity associated with "personal" and as our previously reported behavioral results. The present data set includes data from nine participants that "impersonal" moral judgments (Greene et al., 2001) . In analysis 1, we tested our hypotheses concerning conflict were analyzed previously (Greene et al., 2001). A separate analysis excluding data from these nine participants monitoring in the ACC and abstract reasoning and cognitive control in the DLPFC by comparing high-RT to yielded results consistent with those reported for the full data set. This larger data set also revealed previously low-RT personal moral judgments. In analysis 2, we tested our hypothesis concerning the involvement of unobserved differences in neural activity between personal and impersonal moral judgment (Table 1) , includ-DLPFC in "cognitive" processes underlying utilitarian judgments by subdividing the high-RT personal moral ing a bilateral increase in amygdala activity for personal, as compared to impersonal, moral judgment. judgments according to the participant's behavior, i.e., by comparing "utilitarian" judgments ("appropriate") to nonutilitarian judgments ("inappropriate"). In each of Analysis 1: Difficult versus Easy Personal Moral Judgment these difficult dilemmas, an action that normally would be judged immoral (e.g., smothering a baby) is favored Preliminary to analysis 1, we compared the neural activity associated with difficult personal moral judgments by strong utilitarian considerations (e.g., saving many lives). The participants, in each instance, must decide if to that of a fixation baseline in ROIs generated by our previous experiment comparing personal and imperthe utilitarian action is "appropriate" or "inappropriate." Our hypothesis is that judgments of "appropriate" will sonal moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001). This was done to ensure that the difficult personal moral dilembe associated with greater DLPFC activity than those of "inappropriate," reflecting the influence of "cognitive" mas focused on here (and not just the easy personal moral dilemmas, which previously were not distin-(see Table 2 and Figure 2 ) and inferior parietal lobes (BA 40/39). Also as predicted, we found that difficult, as guished from difficult personal moral dilemmas) engage the previously identified brain regions associated with compared to easy, personal moral dilemmas were associated with increased ACC activity (see Table 2 and emotion and social cognition. As predicted, we found that each of the three brain regions previously exhibiting Figure 2 ). Finally, this contrast also revealed activity in the posterior cingulate cortex (BA 23/31). greater activity for personal, as compared to impersonal, moral judgment (medial prefrontal cortex, BA 9/10; posterior cingulate/precuneus, BA 31/7; and bilateral supeAnalysis 2: Utilitarian Personal Moral Judgment To test the hypothesis that utilitarian moral judgments rior temporal sulcus (STS)/inferior parietal lobe, BA 39) also exhibited above-baseline activity for difficult perengage brain areas associated with "cognitive" processes, we compared the neural activity associated with sonal moral judgments in the current study (p Ͻ 0.05, cluster size Ն 8 voxels). We note that this baseline comutilitarian judgments (accepting a personal moral violation in favor of a greater good) to nonutilitarian judgparison is a particularly strong test of the relevant regions' engagement in our task because these regions ments (prohibiting a personal moral violation despite its utilitarian value). We conducted a planned contrast usare most often found to exhibit decreased neural activity relative to fixation baseline in other studies (Gusnard ing the ROIs generated by analysis 1 (high-versus low-RT). Here we found increased activity for utilitarian, as and Raichle, 2001).
To test the hypothesis that difficult, as compared to compared to nonutilitarian, moral judgment bilaterally in the anterior DLPFC (BA 10) and in the right inferior easy, personal moral dilemmas also engage brain areas associated with abstract reasoning, cognitive conflict, parietal lobe (BA 40) (see Table 3 and Figure 3 ). In addition, we found increased activity for utilitarian moral and cognitive control, we directly compared the neural activity associated with difficult and easy personal moral judgments in the more anterior region of the posterior cingulate (BA 23/31) mentioned above. Other brain redilemmas. More specifically, we divided personal moral judgment trials into three categories based on individugions exhibit this effect as well (see Table 3 ). We note that the utilitarian and nonutilitarian trials compared here ally normalized reaction time (see Experimental Procedures) and compared the neural activity associated with were matched for average RT (see Experimental Procedures). the most difficult trials (upper third/high-RT) to the easiest trials (lower third/low-RT). Mean RT for high-and As a supplemental exploration, we conducted a whole-brain analysis making the same comparison. As low-RT trials were 8.38 and 2.83 s, respectively. Note that the same number of time points was compared for before, we observed increased activity for utilitarian judgments in the right anterior DLPFC (BA 10), inferior each condition (see Experimental Procedures).
As predicted, we found that difficult, as compared parietal lobe (BA 40; this time on the left side), and posterior cingulate (BA 23/31) (see Table 4 In analysis 1, we tested two predictions concerning the predicted that difficult, as compared to easy, personal moral dilemmas would exhibit increased ACC activity, psychological processes engaged in moral judgment and their neural implementation. First, according to our a prediction that was confirmed. Second, we hypothesized that the processes that theory, difficult (high-RT) personal moral dilemmas such as the crying baby dilemma involve a conflict between compete with social-emotional responses to difficult personal moral dilemmas are ones that rely on abstract (1) social-emotional responses that drive people to disapprove of personal moral violations and (2) countervailreasoning and cognitive control. The anterior DLPFC is , and we therefore predicted that this region as served together with that of the DLPFC in tasks that engage working memory and other characteristically well would exhibit increased activity for difficult, as compared to easy, personal moral dilemmas. This prediction "cognitive" processes (Wager and Smith, 2003) . Second, we observed the same effect in an anterior region of the was also confirmed. This result is particularly striking in light of our previous finding that personal moral judgposterior cingulate (BA 23/31). In the replication of our previous results (Table 1) , this area exhibited relatively ment involved decreased activity in the DLPFC, as compared to impersonal moral judgment (Greene et al., 2001).
greater activation for impersonal, as compared to personal, moral judgment. Thus, the activity in this region This analysis yielded several other results that deserve attention. First, our finding that difficult, as compared appears once again to follow the "cognitive" pattern observed in the DLPFC and inferior parietal lobes, deto easy, personal moral judgments involved increased activity bilaterally in the inferior parietal lobes is consisspite the fact that this region lies in the posterior cingu- to assess this hypothesis directly because we did not acquire the necessary physiological data (heart rate variWe note that dilemmas were classified as difficult (high-RT) or easy (low-RT) on a subject-by-subject, perability, etc.). It is worth noting, however, that the conflict monitoring hypothesis may be consistent with the autotrial basis. Thus, a dilemma that was easy for one person could be difficult for another. Nevertheless, the RT renomic regulation hypothesis if, for example, conflict detection by the ACC is associated with negative affect sults for each dilemma were fairly consistent across individuals, allowing us to refer to certain dilemmas as and signals the need for both cognitive and autonomic control. "difficult" or "easy." The footbridge and infanticide dilemmas tended to be easy, while the crying baby dilemma tended to be difficult. The trolley dilemma is Analysis 2
In analysis 2, we tested a second hypothesis concerning impersonal and is therefore not involved in the present analysis (see Figure 1) . the role of "cognitive processes" in moral judgment. In addition to proposing that difficult personal moral Several alternative explanations concerning the present analysis also deserve attention. First, the comparidilemmas involve increased reasoning and cognitive control, we hypothesized that these "cognitive" proson between difficult and easy personal moral judgments is complicated by a potential confound of time on cesses have a preferred behavioral outcome, namely that of favoring utilitarian moral judgments, at least in task: more difficult trials are defined as those associated with longer RT. However, longer RT could also reflect the the context of the difficult personal moral dilemmas employed in this study. prolonged engagement of other, nonspecific processes, such as visual processing and/or motor responding. We These dilemmas share a common structure: a personal moral violation is required to achieve a greater address this concern in our discussion of analysis 2 below. good, as in the crying baby case. These difficult cases contrast with easy personal moral dilemmas such as Similarly, our interpretation draws on the conflict monitoring hypothesis of ACC function (Botvinick et al., the infanticide case in which personal moral violations are proposed but in which the benefits sought are relasuggests that the effects in these three regions were tively small compared to those available in the difficult related to processes occurring after the point of decicases. Thus, it is natural to suppose that a utilitarian, sion. These may have been related to participants' reaccost-benefit analysis is most often the basis for judging tions to their decisions, which may be more salient when personal moral violations to be appropriate in the diffithe participant has recently approved of a personal cult cases. moral violation (e.g., smothering a baby). In support of Reaching an overt judgment on utilitarian grounds this suggestion, we note that overlapping regions in the has two processing requirements. First, the abstract temporal lobes have been associated with the percepreasoning that constitutes a utilitarian analysis must be tion of socially significant actions (Allison et al., 2000) . conducted. Second, cognitive control must be engaged
The significance of the effects observed in these regions to support successful competition of the behavior fais a matter for further research. vored by the outcome of that analysis against any inThe results of analysis 2 help to resolve a potential compatible behavioral pressures (e.g., an emotional reconcern about the results of analysis 1. As noted above, sponse favoring the opposite behavior). Thus, we might the comparison made in analysis 1 between difficult and expect to see neural activity associated with both of easy personal moral dilemmas, based on differences in these demands in the results of analysis 1. That is, diffi-RT, is subject to a confound of time on task. Analysis cult personal moral dilemmas, as compared to easy 2 used the brain areas identified in analysis 1 as a priori ones, will involve both utilitarian reasoning and (in many regions of interest in a comparison in which RT was cases) the application of cognitive control in favoring controlled. Therefore, the results of analysis 2 suggest the utilitarian response over its competitors. However, that the effects related to cognitive control that were the results of analysis 2 are expected to be more restricpredicted and observed in analysis 1 were not merely tive since they examined only difficult dilemmas, comdue to increased time on task and are consistent with our paring activity associated with utilitarian versus nonutilitheory concerning the deployment of cognitive control in tarian responses. Since difficult dilemmas were likely to responding to difficult moral dilemmas. control are typically observed across trials. However, The same effect was observed bilaterally in the inferior another possibility is that it was the engagement of conparietal lobes (BA 40), consistent with the common findtrol in the support of utilitarian responses that produced ing of activity in these areas in tasks engaging cognitive the conflict associated with difficult decisions. That is, control (Wager and Smith, 2003) . This effect was also the recruitment of control reflected in DLPFC activity observed in the posterior cingulate region (BA 23/31) allowed the utilitarian "cognitive" response to compete that, as described above, exhibited increased activity for more effectively with the otherwise prepotent emotional difficult personal moral dilemmas as well as increased response, generating the conflict reflected in ACC activactivity for impersonal, as compared to personal, moral ity. Adjudicating between these alternatives will require judgment. The activity in this region, which is more often greater temporal resolution than our methods provided. associated with emotion (Maddock, 1999), mirrors that of the characteristically "cognitive" brain regions in the "Cognition" and Emotion in Moral Psychology DLPFC and the inferior parietal lobes. Finally, in the wholeFor decades, moral psychology was dominated by ratiobrain version of this analysis, this effect (utilitarian Ͼ nonnalist models according to which moral development utilitarian) was observed in three regions within the temporal lobes. An examination of the time courses of activity consisted of the use of increasingly sophisticated modes of abstract moral reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969 gests that cognitive control processes can override The present data support a synthetic theory of moral these emotional responses, favoring personal moral viojudgment according to which both of these viewpoints lations when the benefits sufficiently outweigh the costs. reflect important aspects of the truth (Greene and Haidt, Thus, both emotional and "cognitive" processes appear 2002). Our earlier work provided initial support for this to be crucial in producing the patterns of neural activity theory through our finding that personal moral judgment and behavior observed in these experiments. This coninvolves relatively greater activity in brain areas associclusion is consistent with a growing body of literature ated with social-emotional processing, while impersonal concerning the respective roles of intuition and deliberamoral judgment involves relatively greater activity in tion in judgment and decision making (Kahneman, 2003). brain areas associated with characteristically "cognitive" processes such as working memory, abstract reaThe Relationship between "Cognition" soning, and problem solving. These neuroscientific findand Emotion ings were complemented by RT data suggesting that
The account we've offered is complicated by the fact some moral dilemmas elicit response conflict between that brain regions other than the DLPFC and inferior negative emotional responses and countervailing proparietal lobes predict utilitarian moral judgment. One of cesses, which we hypothesized to be "cognitive" in nathese regions is in the posterior cingulate (BA 23/31), ture. The present data provide further support for this which has been associated with emotion (Maddock, theory in two ways. First, they corroborate and extend 1999). This finding does not necessarily undermine our our earlier findings in a much larger sample size, providsuggestion that "cognitive" processing tends to favor ing further support for our claims concerning the roles utilitarian judgment in response to the dilemmas emof emotion and "cognition" in moral judgment. Second, ployed here. It does, however, challenge the overly simand more importantly, these data reveal that neural acple view that utilitarian judgments are wholly allied with tivity in classically "cognitive" brain regions predicts a "cognition" while nonutilitarian judgments are wholly alparticular type of moral judgment behavior, thus providlied with "emotion." Like David Hume (Hume, 1978), we ing strong support for the view that both "cognitive" suspect that all action, whether driven by "cognitive" and emotional processes play crucial and sometimes judgment or not, must have some affective basis. Even mutually competitive roles. a cold, calculating utilitarian must be independently moIn analysis 1, we tested and confirmed the prediction tivated, first, to engage in the reasoning that utilitarian that brain regions involved in mediating response conjudgment requires and, second, to respond in accorflict (ACC) and the implementation of cognitive control dance with such judgment. The ACC, a limbic region (DLPFC) exhibit increased activity during difficult, as believed to recruit cognitive control (Botvinick et al., compared to easy, personal moral judgment. These find-2001), is well suited to play the first of these motivational ings support the Kohlbergian claim that high-level cogniroles. We tentatively suggest that the region identified tive processes are marshaled in the resolution of difficult in BA 23/31 of the posterior cingulate may play the secmoral dilemmas and stand in tension with the social ond of these roles. This area was engaged under condiintuitionist claim that in nearly all cases moral judgments tions and in a manner that closely parallels other areas are more akin to perception than episodes of reasoning (in the DLPFC and parietal cortex) that have been consisor reflection (Haidt, 2001) . Likewise, the RT data raise tently associated with nonemotional processing. Thus, doubts about moral judgment as unreflective, as our it is possible that this brain area is involved in mediating participants routinely exhibited RTs over 10 s, and in the interaction between purely "cognitive" processes some cases over 20 s, despite the fact that they were and the affective/motivational processes necessary for not required to justify their answers at any point. The producing behavior. This interpretation draws converengagement of brain areas commonly associated with gent evidence from a recent study of spatial attention deliberative thought processes strengthens this view. (Small et al., 2003) . In analysis 2, we tested and confirmed the prediction Throughout this article, we have relied on a familiar that utilitarian judgment, as compared to nonutilitarian distinction between "emotion" or "affect" on the one judgment, involves increased activity in brain regions hand and "cognition" on the other. This distinction has associated with cognitive control, particularly in the proven useful, and yet it may be somewhat artificial. The DLPFC. This finding challenges both rationalist (Kohlterm "cognition" is often defined in terms of "information berg , 
